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1.  Introduction 
 
The present article presents a critical overview of the main legal ques-
tions which arise from the Israeli military justice system in the West Bank. 
It commences from the inception of the system, focusing on the domestic 
Israeli approach to its juridical configuration and the manner in which 
this informed the interpretation of international law and its applicability 
in the occupied Palestinian territory. The article then proceeds to analyse 
the sources of the system through the distinctive concentration of powers 
underlying its structure, in which legislative, executive and judicial pre-
rogatives are entrusted to the Israeli military. The critical overview con-
cludes with an investigation of the substantive law of the military justice 
system, and its interactions with the wider Israeli institutional apparatus 
exercising control over the territorial space and the population move-
ment in the West Bank. 
The analysis of the concrete operation of the system, through com-
parison with Israeli domestic law and its impact on the human rights of 
the Palestinian population, reveals a significant degree of incompatibility 
not only with international law, but – more profoundly – with the funda-
mental principles determining the parameters of the liberal-democratic 
model of justice in legal orders governed by the rule of law. 
The legal landscape resulting from this overview indicates, on the 
part of Israel, more than merely the unintended consequences of legiti-
mate security concerns and policies; rather, it suggests a precise choice, 
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instrumental to, and a reflection of, a wider project of permanent territo-
rial control pursued by the Israeli authorities in the West Bank. Thus, 
this practice is in direct  contrast with the international legal principles 
governing occupation: non-acquisition of sovereignty, duties to adminis-
ter the occupied territory for the benefit of the local population, and tem-
porariness.1 
In addition, the military justice system, through the creation of a sem-
blance of judicial review – both for the offences of the population under 
occupation and for the actions of the occupying forces – assumes the par-
adoxical function of legitimizing and protecting through penal sanctions 
the implementation of an illegal project. 
 
 
2. Establishing military courts of occupation while rejecting the Law of 
Occupation 
 
The Israeli military justice system is synonymous with the occupation: 
it was established on the third day of the Six Day War, by Proclamation 
No 3 of the Major General of IDF Forces in the West Bank. This order 
was then amended several times until, in 1970, it was replaced by Military 
Order 378 (Security Provisions Order [SPO]). 
The applicability of international humanitarian law was explicit in 
this original order. In Article 35 of the SPO, in fact, it was stated that 
 
‘a military court and its administration shall follow the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Ci-
vilians in War insofar as concerns judicial proceedings, and where this 
Order conflicts with the said Convention, the provisions of the Conven-
tion shall prevail.’ 2 
 
 
1 See A Gross, The Writing on the Wall. Rethinking the Law of Occupation (CUP 
2017) 25 ff. 
2 Proclamation No 3 regarding Entry into Force of the Provisions of Security Order 
7 June 1967, Compilation of Proclamations, Orders and Appointments of the IDF Com-
mand in the West Bank Area No 1 (11 August 1967) 3-5. 
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This provision was short-lived. At the end of 1967, Article 35 was 
substituted by a provision related to the calculation of the periods of de-
tention in relation to sentences upon conviction.3 The disappearance of 
Article 35 was not accompanied by the introduction of any other explicit 
reference to international law in the legal instruments establishing the 
courts.4 
This paradigm shift was not fortuitous. The removal of Article 35, in 
the initial stage of the occupation, is the result of a wider debate concerning 
the legal status of the West Bank and the applicability of international law. 
The Military Advocate General (MAG) at that time, Meir Shamgar – 
who later served as president of Israel’s High Court of Justice (HCJ) – 
assumed a central role in the preparation of the normative framework of 
the military justice system, and of the occupation itself. Shamgar, from 
the early 1960s, compiled texts and guidelines for the military containing 
legal materials, set of precedents of military proclamations and orders, 
and summaries of the municipal law in force in different countries neigh-
bouring Israel, which provided the preparatory background for the ori-
entation of the legal framework of the occupation.5 More importantly, 
the central arguments concerning the inapplicability of the law of occu-
pation6 to the West Bank (which continue to have an enduring effect 
upon the legal discourse about the Israeli occupation) can be traced back 
to the preparatory work of Shamgar. 
The intention to construct a legal doctrine legitimizing Israel’s per-
manent dominion over the conquered areas, led Shamgar to argue that 
 
3 Security Provisions Order (Amendment No 9) Judea and Samaria (Order No 144) 
22 October 1967, Compilation of Proclamations, Orders and Appointments No 8, 303; 
for the Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai, 11 October; central Sinai, 31 December; Shlomo 
region, 29 November; Golan Heights, 3 October. 
4 See Y Ronen, ‘Blind in Their Own Cause: The Military Courts in the West Bank’ 
(2013) 2 Cambridge J Intl Comparative L 746. 
5 See M Shamgar, ‘Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government: 
The Initial Stage’ in M Shamgar (ed), Military Government in the Territories Administered 
by Israel, 1967-1980: The Legal Aspects (vol 1, Harry Sacher Institute for Legislature Re-
search and Comparative Law 1982) 25 ff.  
6 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and 
and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (18 
October 1907) (hereinafter Hague Regulations) Section III, arts 42-56; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 August 
1949) 75 UNTS 287 (hereinafter GC IV) Section III, arts 47-78; both treaties are available 
at <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl>. 
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Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza did not constitute a form of 
occupation. The argument was founded upon the idea that occupation 
only exists when control over an area is acquired from a previous sover-
eign domain. On the contrary, according to Shamgar, the displaced rulers 
in 1967, Jordan and Egypt, were themselves occupants who had seized 
control after the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948. According to this inter-
pretation, therefore, Israel was not occupying a territory, but ‘adminis-
trating disputed areas’, with a sui generis legal status.7 Acknowledging 
Israel’s status as ‘occupant’, in fact, would have signified recognizing Jor-
dan and Egypt as displaced sovereigns, potentially jeopardizing Israeli 
prospects to retain permanent control over the territories.8 This position 
resulted in the rejection of the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention of 1949 and of the law of occupation. The stance was later sys-
tematized and reaffirmed in the doctrine of the ‘missing reversioner’, re-
elaborating Shamgar’s vision and providing it with further (and dubious)9 
international legal justifications.10  
Despite the assertion that Israel had ‘decided to act de facto in accord-
ance with the humanitarian provisions of the [Fourth] Geneva Conven-
tion’11 (the provisions were never precisely identified), the hiatus between 
Palestinian land and Palestinians (as population) was thus legally consti-
tuted, laying the foundations for the enduring obstruction of their right to 
self-determination.12  
 
7 See M Shamgar, ‘The Observance of International Law in the Administered Terri-
tories’ (1971) 1 Israel YB Human Rights 262-77. 
8 See Shamgar, ‘Legal Concepts’ (n 5) 43. 
9 As Dinstein argues, the position sustaining a status of ‘administration of disputed 
territories’ (rather than of occupation) appears ‘based on dubious legal grounds, 
considering that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not make its applicability 
conditional on recognition of titles’ (Y Dinstein, ‘The International Law of Belligerent 
Occupation and Human Rights’ (1978) 8 Israel YB Human Rights 107). 
10 ‘The use of force by the contiguous Arab States having been illegal, it naturally 
could not give rise to any valid legal title. Ex injuria jus non oritur. […] It would seem to 
follow that, in a case like the present where the ousted State never was the legitimate 
sovereign, those rules of belligerent occupation directed to safeguarding that sovereign's 
reversionary rights have no application (YZ Blum, ‘The Missing Reversioner: Reflections 
on the Status of Judea and Samaria’ (1968) 3 Israel L Rev 283 and 293). 
11 Shamgar, ‘The Observance of International Law’ (n 7) 266. 
12 See A Cassese, Self-Determination of People: A Legal Reappraisal (CUP 1995) 238 
ff.; and L Hajjar, Courting Conflict: The Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza 
(U California Press 2005) 56 ff. 
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3.  One and triune: The military as legislative, executive and judiciary 
 
The Israeli military courts operate under the Security Provisions Or-
der, itself amended more than one hundred times. It has also been sup-
plemented through various additional orders concerning specific issues.  
These orders have been incorporated into consolidated versions first 
in 1970,13 and again in 2009, in the Order presently in force.14 Since 2009, 
this last Order has already been amended more than twenty times. 
This military legislation exists together with two other normative sys-
tems: the local criminal laws in force in the region before the occupation 
(for the West Bank mainly Jordanian Criminal Law), and the British De-
fense Emergency Regulations of 1945 enacted during the mandate.  
The British regulations were drafted by the British mandatory power 
over Palestine as repressive measures against acts of terrorism. After the 
merger of East and West Bank in 1950, they were considered repealed 
and were never used. Ironically, they had been the object of vibrant con-
demnations by those who later become Israeli leaders when used against 
the armed Zionist organizations during the mandate. Future Justice Min-
isters and Judges defined them as ‘anarchical and irregular’,15 or ‘unpar-
alleled in any civilized country [for destroying] the very foundations of 
justice’.16 After 1967, however, Israel revived and reactivated these regu-
lations.17 
For what concerns the Jordanian laws, the powers and privileges they 
originally granted to the Jordanian Government have been progressively 
transferred to the military and commuted into prerogatives of the area 
 
13 Security Provisions Order (Judea and Samaria) No 378, 1970, Compilation of 
Proclamations, Orders and Appointments No 21, 33. 
14 Security Provisions Order [Consolidated Version] (Order No 1651) of 2009 
available in English at <http://nolegalfrontiers.org/military-orders/mil019ed2.html? 
lang=en>. 
15 HaPraklit 2/46, quoted in S Jiryis, ‘The Arabs in Israel’ (New York: Monthly 
Review Press 1976) 11–12, in Hajjar (n 12) 60. 
16 Attributed to Y Shimson Shapiro, later Israel’s Ministry of Justice, in the briefing 
paper of Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Men), ‘Twenty Years of Israel Occupation of the 
West Bank and Gaza’ (1987) 11. 
17 R Shehadah, J Kuttab, The West Bank and the Rule of Law (International 
Commission of Jurists 1980) 24. 
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commander.18 The military orders, in addition, proclaim that Israeli mil-
itary laws prevails over or supersede local laws still in force when there is 
a contradiction or an overlap. Military orders, therefore, remain the core 
applicable law in military courts.  
All the mentioned orders are drafted by the MAG and enacted by the 
military commander of the region, who has ‘supreme’ legislative author-
ity to issue, amend, and repeal military orders.  
Overall, it is estimated that there have been over 2,500 military orders 
issued in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 1967, a number of which 
(in particular those related to settlements) remains unpublished.19  
The MAG and the Area Commander enjoy significant powers over 
the appointment of the military judges. The procedure involves a selec-
tion committee, headed by the MAG, which appoints permanent judges 
from the ranks of the IDF’s legal staff, while a selection committee, 
headed by the Deputy MAG, appoints reservist judges. 
The MAG also has a central role in the prosecutorial hierarchy. The 
MAG supervises a legal advisor and a chief prosecutor of the region, who, 
in turn, coordinate the head prosecutors of the single military courts. 
While from an administrative perspective, the prosecution is considered to 
be separate from the judiciary, judges and prosecutors are members of the 
same IDF units,20 and it leaves open the possibility that judges presiding 
over hearings might be inferior in rank to military prosecutors. 
Importantly, claiming the authority to maintain public order, the 
IDF in the West Bank is also conferred with executive tasks, first of all 
arrest powers.  
In this regard, the systematicity of arbitrary arrests and detention is the 
subject of a constant flow of denunciations from NGOs, condemning fre-
quent physical and verbal abuses during arrest procedures, as well as tor-
ture and ill treatment during interrogations, of both Palestinian adults and 
children.21  
 
18 ibid 29 ff. 
19 K Cavanaugh, ‘The Israeli Military Court System in the West Banka and Gaza’ 
(2007) 12 J Conflict Security L (2007) 201. 
20 See Hajjar (n 12) 254. 
21 See, inter alia, Amnesty International, ‘Annual Report 2016/17’ 202 ff. 
<www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2017/02/amnesty-international-annual-report-
201617/>, and the join report of B’Tselem and Hamoked, ‘Backed by the System: Abuse 
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In relation to deprivation of liberty, in theory, Palestinians of the 
West Bank should be entitled to habeas corpus. In practice, there is no 
requirement that an arrest be preceded by a detention order, nor that the 
person be informed of the reasons for arrest at the time he or she is taken 
into custody, for up to 96 hours.22 At the same time, lawyer-client meet-
ings are often prohibited as long as the detainee is under interrogation. 
A detainee can be held in custody for up to eighteen days without charge 
before being brought before a judge, while incommunicado detention – 
after SPO amendments in 2002 – can last up to twelve days. To stand 
trial without being held in custody, a detainee must request to be release 
on bail – a request that is very rarely granted. For the vast majority of 
detainees, the detention lasts until their case is concluded. 
In the case of administrative detention, praeter delictum measures in-
tended to thwart a prospective danger, no formal charge at all is issued 
against the suspect and often no evidence is disclosed in the hearings be-
fore military courts.  Administrative detainees are thus, from the outset, 
denied the rights to which defendants in criminal proceedings are nor-
mally entitled. They do not know when they will be released (prompting 
different NGOs to denounce a form of psychological torture),23 and there 
is no restriction on the length of time of their detention. The maximum 
six-month period of custody allowed by a single military commander’s 
administrative detention order, is in fact renewable sine die through sub-
sequent orders. 
Appellate review of first instance military courts’ decisions was only 
established in 1989, when, after the recommendation of Israel’s High 
Court of Justice in the Arjub case,24 a military court of appeals was estab-
lished. The president of the military court of appeal, however, works un-
der supervision of the MAG, thereby reproducing within this judicial 
 
and Torture at the Shikma Interrogation Facility’ (December 2015) <www.btselem.org/ 
publications/summaries/201512_backed_by_the_system>. 
22 See Security Provisions Order [Consolidated Version] (Order No 1651) of 2009, 
Chapter C, art 31 (A) and (C). 
23 See Addameer – Prisoners Support and Human Rights Organization, ‘Induced 
Desperation: The Psychological Torture of Administrative Detentions’ factsheet 26 June 
2016 <www.addameer.org/publications/induced-desperation-psychological-torture-
administrative-detention>. 
24 Arjub v The Military Commander in the West Bank, HCJ 87/85 PD 42(1) (1988) 
353 ff. 
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body the issues of ‘non-political’ composition and independent operation 
affecting the lower levels of the system.25 
Judicial review of the military court system by civil courts is under-
taken by Israel’s HCJ. This Court has on different occasions, and to var-
ious degrees, affirmed that the military government, and thus the military 
court system, derives its authority from the international law of belliger-
ent occupation.26 However, despite this recognition, in the vast majority 
of cases, the principles of judicial review have been derived from the rules 
of Israeli administrative law, rather than international law.27 In other 
cases, the Court – as argued by Kretzmer – ‘has done its best to avoid 
ruling on the compatibility of actions or policies with international hu-
manitarian law, either by relying on the distinction between customary 
and conventional law, or by glossing over the issue’.28 In addition, the 
HCJ, as the final civilian appellate jurisdiction for military courts, has of-
ten based its balancing operations upon presumptions of proportionality, 
based on the idea that identification and delimitation of the military 
needs are unreviewable prerogatives of the military commander.29 Ac-
cording to the Court, in fact, when ‘there is more than one way to satisfy 
the proportionality demand […] a zone of proportionality (similar to a 
zone of reasonableness) should be recognized. Any means which the ad-
ministrative body chooses from within the zone is proportional’.30  
As domestic court, therefore, the HCJ ‘does not substitute its own 
 
25 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (Fourth Geneva Convention) (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 287, arts 64 and 66. 
26 See Abu Itta and Others v Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank and Others, 
HCJ 69/81 PD 37(2) (1983) 197, 228, 301; Jamait Iscan v IDF Commander in Judea and 
Samaria  HCJ 393/82 PD 37(4) (1983) 785, para 23. 
27 See D Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the 
Occupied Territories (State UNY Press 2002) passim. 
28 D Kretzmer, ‘The Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel’ 
(2012) 94 Intl Rev Red Cross 215. See also the important reflection of M Koskenniemi, 
‘Occupied Zone – A Zone of Reasonableness?’ (2008) 41 Israel L Rev 13-40. 
29  ‘The military commander is the expert regarding the military quality of the 
separation fence route. We are experts regarding its humanitarian aspects. The military 
commander determines where, on hill and plain, the separation fence will be erected. 
That is his expertise. We examine whether this route’s harm to the local residents is 
proportional. That is our expertise’ (Beit Sourik Village Council v The Government of 
Israel HCJ 2056/04 (2004) 807, para 48, English translation available at 
<http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/560/020/A28/04020560>. 
30 ibid para 42. 
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discretion for that of the military commander, but only examines whether 
the commander acted within the limits of his authority and within the 
margin of reasonable conduct’.31 Considering the aforementioned legis-
lation, it is clear that the limits of the commander’s authority and his mar-
gins of appreciation are nearly unlimited. The mentioned HCJ’s jurispru-
dence has ratified and reinforced this discretion.32  
In sum, the Israeli military exercises absolute powers over Palestini-
ans, cumulating legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands. 
These absolute powers are not only displayed over a population that has 
never been called to approve them, nor to control them through political 
processes, but couple with a substantive law that pervasively and harshly 
regulates social, political and private life of the Palestinians (see infra). 
 
 
4.  Discriminatory legal dualism 
 
The competency of the military courts is regulated by the SPO, which 
is silent on qualifications related to the ratione personae jurisdiction. Mil-
itary courts originally embraced an interpretation of the SPO as empow-
ering them to try, together with the Palestinian residents of the West 
Bank and Gaza, also Israeli nationals when charged with offences com-
mitted in the occupied territories.33 Since the early 1980s, however, in 
open rejection of the principle of territoriality in the application of crim-
inal law, Israeli nationals, residents and settlers have been prosecuted 
only under Israeli domestic law before Israeli courts. This policy of dual 
justice – established by explicit legislation of the Knesset34 and upheld by 
 
31 Ronen (n 4) 761. 
32 As aptly summarized by Michael Sfard in his book review of Kretzmer’s The Oc-
cupation of Justice (n 27), ‘In almost every point where the court had to interpret interna-
tional law, to establish the boundaries of authority, to declare the legality of a policy, [it] 
has chosen the path which strengthened the powers of the military commander, broad-
ened the borders of his authority and legitimized his decisions. [It] dismissed legally well-
established petitions in the cost of breaking basic tenants of legal interpretation and it 
even sacrificed the consistency of its own decisions when it had to’ (M Sfard, ‘Book Re-
view. The Human Rights Lawyer’s Existential Dilemma’ (2005) 38 Israel L Rev 160-161). 
33 See Military Prosecutor v Abu Janem, Gaza 1238/69 ‘Selected Judgments of the 
Military Courts’ (vol 1, 1969) 130 para 140. 
34 Art 2(a) of the Emergency Regulations (legal assistance) states that ‘Israeli courts 
have jurisdiction to try according to Israeli law any person who is present in Israel and 
who committed an act in the Region, and any Israeli who committed an act in the PA, if 
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the HCJ jurisprudence35 – has installed a structure of legal and jurisdic-
tional discrimination, based on nationality, under which military courts 
enforce military law against Palestinians, while Israeli civilian courts ap-
ply domestic law to Israelis and settlers irrespective of whether the of-
fences were committed in the occupied Palestinian territory.  
If an Israeli citizen commits an offense in the West Bank, in fact, it is 
the Israeli criminal legal system that is applicable. The accused will be 
tried according to the Israeli criminal code and rule of procedure, and 
will be entitled to the right of due process granted by Israeli constitu-
tional Law. As synthetized by Justice Barak’s metaphor, while being in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Israeli citizens carry in their ‘back-
pack’ Israeli criminal law.36 Hence, it can be argued that settlers act not 
only as ‘vectors’ of territorial control, but also of jurisdictional annexa-
tion, by projecting the domestic law of the occupying power into foreign 
territory it occupies, despite its absence of sovereignty. 
This dualism is accompanied by a significant difference in the position 
of the accused within the two systems. The difference is exemplified by the 
maximum period of detention before being brought to a judge (24 hours 
in Israeli domestic law, compared with 8 days under military orders), the 
maximum period of detention without access to a lawyer (48 hours under 
Israeli domestic law compared with 90 days under military orders), and the 
maximum period of detention without charge (30 days under Israeli do-
mestic law compared with potentially unlimited imprisonment under re-
newable administrative detention orders).37 
Another significant example of this dualism is the differential treat-
ment of minors. Under Israeli criminal law, a ‘minor’ is a person who has 
not yet turned 18. By contrast, until 2011, under military legislation mi-
nors had been divided into three age groups: ‘child’, under the age of 12; 
‘juvenile’, between ages 12 and 14; ‘young adult’, between ages 14 and 
 
those acts would have constituted an offence had they occurred in the territory under the 
jurisdiction of Israeli courts’. Section 2(c) states ‘this Regulation does not apply on 
residents of the Region or the PA, who are not Israelis.’ 
35 Inter alia see Tsoba v State of Israel HCJ 831/80 PD 36 (2) 169, 174. 
36 S Weill, ‘Reframing the Legality of the Israeli Military Courts in the West Bank: 
Military Occupation or Apartheid?’ in A Baker, A Matar (eds), Threat: Palestinian 
Political Prisoners in Israel (Pluto Press 2011) 136. 
37 I Misk, ‘The Current Situation and Conditions of Imprisonment of Palestinians in 
Israeli Prisons and Detention Facilities’ Paper presented at the UN International Meeting 
on the Question of Palestine (Vienna, 7 and 8 March 2011) table 2, at 4. 
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16. In other words, military legislations defined a Palestinian over the age 
of 16 as an adult. The 2011 amendment to the SPO changed the defini-
tion of ‘minor’, which now includes those who have not yet reached 18 
years of age, but solely for the purpose of adjudication proceedings. For 
the purpose of all other proceedings – arrest, detention and interrogation 
– the age of majority is still 16. Military Order 132 also allows 12 year old 
children to be tried in military courts.38 
Further, the significant difference between the two systems in the for-
mal position of the accused is compounded by the differences in the pol-
icies and practices of the enforcement of the law. This is the case, for 
example, of settlers’ offenses against Palestinians, which very rarely lead 
to indictment and even more rarely to conviction.  
Organisations analysing this issue report that 85.3% of investigation 
files are closed due the failure by police investigators to locate suspects 
or to collect sufficient evidence to support indictments; just 7.4% of in-
vestigations yielded indictments against suspects and just in one-third of 
these legal proceedings ended in the full or partial conviction of the de-
fendants. In sum, the likelihood that a complaint submitted to the Israel 
Police by a Palestinian will lead to conviction of the suspect is just 1.8%.39  
In contrast, of those who are charged in the military courts’ system, 
approximately 90 to 95% are convicted,40 with some yearly records arriv-
ing at 99.74%.41  
This dualistic legal system, in addition, openly contravenes the parti-
tions resulting from the ‘Oslo Two’ agreements. Under the Interim 
Agreement concluded by Israel and the PLO in 1995, in fact, offences 
committed by Palestinians in Area A and B should have been excluded 
 
38 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, ‘One Rule, Two Legal Systems: Israel’s 
Regime of Laws in the West Bank’ (October 2014) 67 <www.acri.org.il/ 
en/2014/11/24/twosysreport/>. 
39 See Y Din, ‘Mock Enforcement: Law enforcement on Israeli civilians in the West 
Bank’ (May 2015) <www.yesh-din.org/en/mock-enforcement-law-enforcement-on-
israeli-civilians-in-the-west-bank/>. 
40 Hajjar (n 12) 3. 
41 C Levinson, ‘Nearly 100% of All Military Court Cases in West Bank End in 
Conviction, Haaretz Learns’, Haaretz (29 November 2011) <www.haaretz.com/nearly-100-
of-all-military-court-cases-in-west-bank-end-in-conviction-haaretz-learns-1.398369>. 
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from the jurisdiction of the military courts.42 The interim agreement re-
quired the transfer of responsibility to the Palestinian Authority to be 
ratified by the military commander through Proclamation No 7.43 Under 
the terms of this Proclamation, however, it did not amend the definition 
of the term ‘Region’ (as the Agreement would have required), therefore, 
under domestic military law, ‘Region’ continues to mean the entire West 
Bank.44 This has allowed the military courts to preserve jurisdiction over 
all acts which the military authorities consider harmful or intended to 
harm the security of the West Bank, included those committed in areas 
A and B, formally under Palestinian exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction. 
 
 
5.  The substantive law of the military courts in the wider ‘carceralization’ 
of the West Bank 
 
According to UN sources published in 2008,45 it is estimated that ap-
proximately 760,000 Palestinian men, women and children have been im-
prisoned by the Israeli military from 1967. For Palestinians NGOs,46 the 
number is estimated to be more than 800.000, almost half of the total 
current population of the West Bank. These numbers indicate a policy of 
mass incarceration, and this raises the question of the connection be-
tween this policy and the substantive law enforced by the military courts. 
Ratione materiae, the courts’ jurisdiction encompasses any offence 
defined by enactments of the military commander, constituting the ‘se-
curity legislation’, and any offence under Jordanian law (applied residu-
 
42 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (28 
September 1995) Annex IV Article I (1997) 36 Intl L Materials 557. 
43 Military Proclamation No 7 Concerning the Application of the Interim Agreement 
(West Bank) (1995), published in CPOA, No 164, 1923. 
44 See S Weill, ‘The Judicial Arm of the Occupation: The Israeli Military Courts in 
the Occupied Territories’ (2007) 89 Intl Rev Red Cross 403. 
45 See UN HRC ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, John Dugard’ (21 January 2008) UN 
Doc A/HRC/7/17 at 19, para 45.  
46 See ‘Over 800,000 Palestinians Imprisoned by Israel Since 1967, Says Erekat’ 
Haaretz (April 2017) <www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.586114>; see also 
Addameer–Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, ‘Palestinian Political 
Prisoners in Israeli Prisons’ (General Briefing 2014)  <www.addameer.org/advocacy/ 
briefings_papers>. 
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ally to ordinary crimes). The security legislation establishes two catego-
ries of offences: those jeopardizing military interests or the safety of the 
territory, commonly identified as ‘security offenses’, and those against 
public order. These offenses effectively regulate every aspect of Palestin-
ian life, targeting anything deemed to threaten Israeli security, through 
the prohibition of a wide spectrum of activities, extending from forms of 
political expression, association, protest and movement (in the security 
legislation), to violations of licensing provisions and traffic regulations (in 
the offences against public order).  
In terms of respect of the general principles of criminal law in liberal-
democratic legal systems, this legislation raises very serious concerns. 
Firstly, the substantive offences are characterized by very broad defini-
tions, in violation of the principles of definiteness of the statues and of 
precision of the types of offence, thus allowing extremely ample margins 
of judicial discretion. This indeterminacy, in addition, appears particu-
larly worrisome when considered in relation to offences sanctioning mere 
expressions, far beyond the fundamental harm principle that should al-
ways govern and limit choices of criminalization.47 For example, Article 
215 of the SPO (consolidated version of 2009)48 states  
 
‘A person who insults a soldier or does any other act offending his honor 
[emphasis added] or harming his position as a soldier shall be sentenced 
to one year imprisonment.’ 
 
The offence is further extended by Article 219 which criminalizes an 
individual who ‘behaves in an insulting manner [emphasis added] toward 
one of the IDF authorities in the Area or toward one of its symbols.’ 
Much longer sentences are imposed, instead, on those who – conversely 
– support or ‘express sympathy’ to ‘hostile’ or ‘unlawful’ organizations. 
For example, Article 251 states 
 
‘A person who: (1) Attempts, orally or otherwise, to influence public 
opinion in the Area in a manner which may harm public peace or public 
order, or (2) Carries out any action or holds in his possession any object 
with the intention of executing or facilitating the execution of an attempt 
[emphasis added] to influence public opinion in the Area in a manner 
 
47 A Ashworth, J Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 27 ff. 
48 For all the articles cited in this section see above (n 14). 
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which may harm public peace or public order, or (3) Publishes words 
of praise, sympathy or support for a hostile organization, its actions or 
objectives, or (4) Carries out an action expressing identification with a 
hostile organization, with its actions or its objectives or sympathy for 
them, by flying a flag, displaying a symbol or slogan or playing an an-
them or voicing a slogan, or any similar explicit action clearly expressing 
such identification or sympathy, and all in a public place or in a manner 
that persons in a public place are able to see or hear such expression of 
identification or sympathy – shall be sentenced to ten years imprison-
ment [emphases added].’ 
 
In sum, waving a flag, singing, pronouncing a slogan publicly, or ‘fa-
cilitating the execution of an attempt to influence public opinion’ (all-en-
compassing formulation that renders impossible to determine what it 
does include) that could disturb public order, are all conduct deserving 
10 years of imprisonment, if the flag, the song, the slogan can be ‘associ-
ated’ with or express ‘sympathy’ for an ‘unlawful association’. The list of 
unlawful associations contained in Regulation 84 of the Defence (Emer-
gency) Regulations of 1945, contains not only dozens of students organi-
zations, charities and NGOs, but continues to include the PLO, never 
erased from the list by Israel. Most members of the Palestinian Authority, 
therefore, are technically criminal members of an unlawful association, 
and all the public expressions of support for them could fall within the 
scope of application of this provision. 
Secondly, upon conviction, the imposition of sentences is not guided 
by principles of coherence and proportionality. The procedure of sen-
tencing is marked by an irrational severity and disproportionality in 
which neither a clear hierarchy nor a conception of aggravation are evi-
dent. For example, Article 212 of the SPO (consolidate version of 2009), 
states  
 
‘a person who throws an object, including a stone 1) in a manner that 
[…] may harm traffic in a transportation lane [or] (2) At a […]  property, 
with the intent to harm the […] property, shall be sentenced to ten years 
imprisonment [empahises added];’  
 
Furthermore, if the object is thrown ‘at a moving vehicle with the 
intent to harm it, [the person] shall be sentenced to twenty years impris-
onment [emphases added].’ 
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Thirdly, and most importantly, the extension of criminal liability be-
yond the actual perpetrators to include potential accessories is formu-
lated without defining an actus reus, nor a mens rea in relation to the con-
duct of the principal offender(s). A member of a group, in fact, can be 
punished on the sole basis of the membership, if other members – even-
tually without his knowledge or possibility to foresee their conduct – have 
committed certain offences. In this way, as a matter of fact, this legislation 
overcomes the fundamental principle of personality of the criminal lia-
bility, sanctioning individuals for mere proximity to other offenders.  
The problem becomes even more concerning when considering that 
these forms of liability (without conduct and mental element) can give 
rise to life imprisonment. Article 231, in fact, states that 
 
‘A member of a group in which one or more of its members, commit or 
committed, while members of the group, an offense under Section 230 
[Carrying, holding and manufacturing weapons] shall be sentenced to 
life imprisonment [emphasis added].’ 
 
Alongside these extremes, the SPO prohibits various forms of soli-
darity and contact between Palestinians, all the times when ‘there is rea-
sonable basis to suspect that [the other person] committed an offense or 
was engaged in any action aimed at harming public order’.49 The SPO 
even criminalizes those who do not immediately denounce when there 
are ‘reasonable grounds to suspect that another person is committing or 
planning to commit an offense’ under the SPO.50   
The combined effect of the norms described generates a pervasive 
authoritarian interference in private and social life of the population. For 
example, a Palestinian will be liable every time he does not ‘immediately 
denounce’ a person when he has ‘reasonable basis to suspect’ that this 
person is going to ‘facilitate an attempt to influence public opinion in a 
manner that can harm public order’. In other words, the SPO engages in 
an overt over-criminalization of the occupied population in which the 
legal norms, rather than clearly demarcating criminal and non-criminal 
behaviour, render every single Palestinian potentially, and unwittingly, 
subject to a criminal penalty. 
 
49 See SPO, art 245. 
50 See SPO, art 261. 
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In sum, the whole substantive law enforced by the Military Courts 
reproduces an utterly authoritarian model of justice, which is not only at 
variance with the principles of international law, but also with the funda-
mental penal safeguards descending from the general principles of crim-
inal law in every liberal legal order governed by the Rule of Law. 
This substantive law should not be considered and assessed in isola-
tion, since it is just one component of the wider and more complex Israeli 
policy and practice of military control over the West Bank. The SPO, in 
its Article 242, also subjects persons ‘entering restricted areas’ (identified 
as areas held by the IDF or serving a security purpose or used for essential 
services) or ‘wandering in the proximity of the area without being em-
powered to do so’ to ten years imprisonment. When analysing this kind 
of offences, it must be taken into account that Palestinians’ freedom of 
movement within the occupied Palestinian territory is ‘significantly re-
stricted by a complex and multi-layered system of administrative, bureau-
cratic and physical constraints, including permit requirements, check-
points, and physical obstacles impacting almost every aspect of daily 
life’.51  
Military law, in fact, creates for Palestinian a draconian set of prohi-
bitions to enter Israel, exit the West Bank, move from or to, or even 
simply reside in certain areas (such as the ones located between the Green 
Line and the separation wall)52 without a permit issued by the military. 
Thousands of Palestinians are convicted for violating the permit regime 
each year. 
It is precisely the combined effect of offences related to illegal access 
or transit, policies of territorial erosion and fragmentation, together with 
the omnipresent and severe restrictions upon Palestinians’ freedom of 
movement, which indicates the actual impact of the military system as a 
whole on Palestinians’ lives. Maps and data recently made available by 
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs53 offer an 
 
51 UNHRC, ‘Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including 
East Jerusalem, Report of the Secretary General’ (16 March 2017) UN doc A/HRC/34/38 
at 14, para 61. 
52 See Hamoked, ‘The Permit Regime Human Rights Violations in West Bank Areas 
Known as the ‘Seam Zone’ (March 2013)  <www.hamoked.org/files/2013/ 
1157660_eng.pdf>. 
53 UNOCHA, ‘West Bank Access Restrictions’ (January 2017)  <www.ochaopt.org/ 
content/west-bank-access-restrictions-january-2017>.  
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elucidative summary of this stifling control, articulated in an intricate net 
of 96 internal and border checkpoints, 72 road blocks, 124 road gates, 60 
km of barriers, 24 km trenches, military bases and settlements actually 
resulting in Israeli military control over 42% of the entire territory.  
Overall, the Israeli military rule over the West Bank, alongside mass 
incarceration, is deploying and multiplying on large scale devices to con-
trol space and movements typical of penitentiary regimes. An entire re-
gion, in other words, is being subjected to a progressive and historically 
unique process of permanent territorial ‘carceralization’,54 in which more 
and more the dividing lines between ethnicity and enmity, offence and 
collective punishment, movement and displacement, surveillance and 
custody, security and segregation, are fading away. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion: Courts of exception for endless occupation 
 
It appears that, from the outset, the military courts’ system has been 
intended as a judicial arm of an autopoietic system, in which the Grun-
dorm was the military conquest, and the fundamental legislator was the 
military that determined its own authority on a de facto basis.55 Whilst 
this has arguably always been the case of temporally limited military oc-
cupations, the international law of occupation was intended to intervene 
to avoid anomalies – both in terms of discipline, space and time – and 
limit arbitrariness of the powers deriving from such situations. 
Occupation, as a rule without sovereignty, is both empowered and 
limited by international law as an exceptional regime for exceptional cir-
cumstances. Contemporary international law conceives sovereignty as 
conferred to the people, which substantiates their inherent right to self-
determination.56 Occupation, as a factual phenomenon, challenges and 
places a temporary obstacle on this nexus, by removing the connection 
 
54 In this regard, the situation described physically materializes the theoretical image 
of ‘carceral archipelago’ coined by Foucault (See M Foucault, Discipline and Punish (A 
Sheridan tr, Vintage Books 1995) 297). 
55 See Proclamation No 2 Regarding Regulation of Administration and Law (7 June 
1967) Compilation of Proclamations, Orders and Appointments of the IDF Command in 
the West Bank Area No 1, 11 August 1967, available at <http://nolegalfrontiers.org/ mil-
itary-orders/mil039ed2.html?lang=en>. 
56 See Cassese (n 12) passim. 
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between sovereignty and territorial control (as opposed to formal entitle-
ment thereto). It is, however, not merely a factual phenomenon, but also 
a normative state of affairs, since it exists and can be recognized, and 
organized, only through the suspension of basic principles of the rule of 
law. If this suspension becomes permanent, the exception becomes the 
rule, and its normative legitimation based on occupation law is arguably 
dissolved.57 
Occupation, thus, appears to be the legal regime of exception par ex-
cellence. It is the only one in which a foreign power can subjugate another 
population that has not granted it any legitimacy and authority, nor con-
ferred to it any power to decide over extraordinary and emergency situ-
ations.58 This being the case, occupation reproduces the contradictions 
of pre-modern foreign conquests, colonisations, and absolutism, whilst 
simultaneously exceeding it in the absence of any form of popular legiti-
mation. 
International humanitarian law attempts to contain and humanize 
this exception par excellence through a ‘search to bring de facto power 
within the compass of the law to think of it in terms of ‘authority’ instead 
of simple usurpation’. 59  
This tension between the logic of power and conquest, on the one 
hand, and the language of law and authority, on the other, delineates the 
field of antagonist paradigms in which the law of occupation attempts to 
strike its balance, which can only operate insofar this law maintains a tem-
porary ‘compromise’ between the two opposite instances. 
If this tension is neutralized through the permanent conflation of the 
two polarities, however, there is no balance at all to strike, because is the 
‘power and conquest’ binomial – which in the West Bank works as source 
and purpose of military legislation and jurisdiction – that dictates the ra-
 
57 See O Ben-Naftali, AM Gross, K Michaeli, ‘Illegal Occupation: Framing the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (2005) 23 Berkeley J Intl L 554; E Benvenisti, ‘The 
Security Council and the Law of Occupation: Resolution 1483 on Iraq in Historical 
Perspective’ (2003) 1 Israel Defense Forces L Rev 19. 
58 Occupation, therefore, would deserve an apposite treatise in the field of reflections 
developed with respect to art 48 of the Weimar Constitution and to the Schmittian 
conception of sovereignty. See G Agamben, State of Exception (Kevin Attel tr, U Chicago 
Press 2005) and Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of 
Sovereignty (George Schwab tr, U Chicago Press 2005). 
59 Koskenniemi (n 28) 38. 
Enforcing illegality: Israel’s military justice in the West Bank                                           39 
 
 
tionales of the ‘law and authority’ logic. In this way, the Israeli authori-
ties’ continued effort of ‘characterizing occupation in managerial terms 
as regular “government”’ has progressively wiped out the sense of its ex-
ceptionality, 60 and temporariness. 
In this context, the humanitarian idea of a ‘benevolent occupant’, 
careful to exercise its powers only in the measure strictly necessary to 
temporarily assure its security and the public order of the area,61 and to 
administer those powers in the interest of the local population,62 demon-
strate a certain measure of impossibility and ingenuity.  
Every legal apparatus, in fact, is designed and intended to serve a po-
litical project. Since the political project put forward by the Israel mili-
tary-legal system is one of unlawfully prolonged occupation,63 toward 
permanent territorial control, the courts’ central role will remain that to 
serve as agency of dispossession of both basic human rights and territory 
of the Palestinian population, advancing Israel’s ‘creeping’ annexation.64 
In this process, however, the rights of Palestinians are not the only 
juridical good at stake. The Israeli occupation, in fact, erodes the general 
normativity of the jus ad bellum principles underpinning the proper func-
tion of the law of occupation; namely, the prohibition of acquisition of 
territory through the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity 
of states. Failure to ensure the diligent application of this principle to the 
current set of facts undermines the credibility of international community 
and institution, and forecloses the activation of third state responsibilities 
of non-recognition of the unlawful territorial situation maintained by 
such illegal use of force.65 
In sum, the Israeli military justice system of occupation challenges 
separation and autonomy of jus in bello and jus ad bellum considerations, 
 
60 ibid. 
61 See Hague Regulations, art 43. 
62 See Hague Regulations, art 55. 
63 See V Azarova, ‘Israel’s unlawfully prolonged occupation: consequences under an 
integrated legal framework’ European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief (2 June 
2017) <www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/israels_unlawfully_prolonged_ 
occupation_7294>. 
64 See OM Dajani, ‘Israel's Creeping Annexation’ (2017) 111 AJIL 51-56. 
65 See E Milano, Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law. Reconciling 
Effectiveness, Legality and Legitimacy (Martinus Nijhoff 2005) 113 ff.; see also Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins [2004] ICJ Rep para 159. 
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realizing a regime in which the rejection of the applicability of the former 
emanates from, complements, and reinforces the persisting violation of 
the latter.  
In this domain, hence, it is legitimate to doubt the effectiveness of 
legal analyses seeking to enhance the compliance of the military justice 
system to specific humanitarian obligations, without illuminating paths 
toward the end of the occupation and the abolition of the system itself, 
as judicial arm of a protracted jus ad bellum violation. A violation, more-
over, legitimized precisely by conveying a semblance of law enforcement 
which at the same time obstructs victims’ access to justice.66 
Following Moyn’s reflection on civil libertarianism and endless war, 
the danger of merely humanitarian approaches is the implicit, and per-
haps involuntary, demand for a ‘cleaner and endless’ occupation.67 But 
endless occupation – as this analysis of the military justice system indi-
cates – cannot be legally ‘cleaned up’, in order to justify and normalize 
the endless injustices it produces.  
After five decades of Israeli occupation, therefore, the West Bank has 
become the exemplary terrain on which to evaluate the potential for in-
ternational legal scholarship and institutions to realise the normative po-
tential for dignity, justice and peace of international law, or if, on the 
contrary, they will render international law synonymous with the law of 
force, in which right is might, and the capacity for aggressive war – far 
from being restrained by law – is what shapes law itself. 
 
66 See B’Tselem, ‘The Occupation's Fig Leaf: Israel's Military Law Enforcement 
System as a Whitewash Mechanism’ (May 2016)  <www.btselem.org/publications/ 
summaries/201605_occupations_fig_leaf>.  
67 See S Moyn, ‘Toward a History of Clean and Endless War’ Just Security (9 
October 2015) <www.justsecurity.org/26697/sanitizing-war-endlessness/>. 
